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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant takes this opportunity to respond to the arguments 
set forth in the brief of Respondent. The remaining arguments of 
the Appellant are adequately covered in Appellant's original 
Appellate Brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Annotated §41-6-55(3) 
2. Utah Code Annotated §41-6-73 
3. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 
4. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 
5. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 30 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. At the time of the subject accident, the weather was 
sunny and clear (T. 48, lines 7-10; T. 121, lines 19-25; T. 122, 
lines 1-5; T. 129, line 6; T. 143, lines 6-8, 20-21). The road 
conditions were dry and clear (T. 48, lines 11-12; T. 143, lines 6-
8, 20-21). 
2. At trial, there was no evidence admitted to prove that 
there was any glare from the sun, and whereas the parties were 
headed north at the time of the accident (between 10:00 and 11:00 
a.m.), no glare should be inferred (T. 42, lines 7-8, 24-25; T. 
140, lines 15-17). 
3. Just prior to the accident, Defendant Warren Yarnell was 
traveling north from the top of the hill to the bottom of the hill 
on 1900 West just past the intersection with 1200 North; the only 
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car in front of Mr. Yarnell traveling north was the Noonan vehicle; 
there was no evidence admitted to prove that there was any south-
bound traffic (T. 49, lines 14-25; T. 54, lines 22-25; T. 55, lines 
1-3; T. 70, lines 6-15; T. 71, lines 10-25; T. 72, lines 1-3, 23-
25; T. 73, lines 1-2; T. 114, lines 6-9; T. 121, lines 19-22; T. 
141, lines 18-20; T. 177, lines 9-10; T. 214, lines 11-14; T. 369, 
lines 13-17) . 
4. Defendant Yarnell had a completely unobstructed view of 
traffic to his north just prior to the accident (T. 70, lines 16-
18; T. 74, lines 21-25; T. 114, lines 1-5; T. 121, lines 19-25; T. 
122, lines 1-5; T. 143, lines 2-8; T. 177, lines 11-19). 
5. At trial, there was no evidence submitted of any kind to 
prove that weather, road conditions, highway defects or design, 
other traffic, obstructions, acts of God, animals or any other type 
of intervening force contributed in any way to the causation of the 
subject accident (T. 42-165, 170-232, 363-444). 
6. Both vehicles involved in the subject accident were newer 
vehicles, and there was no evidence submitted at trial to prove 
that any type of design or manufacturing defects of the vehicles or 
any type of malfunctions of the vehicles contributed in any way to 
the causation of the accident (T. 42-165, 170-232, 363-444; T. 41, 
lines 18-25; T. 45, line 13; Defendant's Trial Exhibits # 2, 3, 4 
and 5). In fact, the only evidence submitted concerning the 
functioning of the vehicles was testimony to the effect that the 
vehicles were functioning properly at the time of the accident (T. 
45, lines 12-15; T. 49, lines 7-10; T. 146, lines 2-12). 
2 
7• There was no evidence submitted at trial to dispute that 
both drivers involved in the accident had valid drivers licenses 
(T. 135, lines 20-23; T. 136, lines 10-20). Both drivers were 
wearing their eye glasses at the time of the accident (T. 53, lines 
1-5; T. 113, lines 16-18). Defendant Warren Yarnell may have been 
on medication at the time of the accident (T. 370, lines 10-16). 
Also, Mr. Yarnell was 70 years old at the time of the accident, so 
it should be inferred that he would have the natural slowing of 
physical reactions that occurs with age (T. 112, lines 17-25; T. 
113, lines 1-9; T. 129, lines 2-3; T. 195, lines 22-25; T. 196, 
lines 1-22). 
8. Just prior to the accident, Plaintiff Tina Noonan had 
missed her planned turn off, and she was unfamiliar with the area 
(T. 42, lines 14-16; T. 54, lines 3-7, 15-17; T. 56, lines 15-21; 
T. 63, lines 17-19; T. 145, lines 4-12). Defendant Warren Yarnell 
was on his way to the Smith & Edwards store near Brigham City to do 
some shopping (T. 113, lines 19-23; T. 129, lines 6-7; T. 364, line 
25) . 
9. It was Ms. Noonan's belief concerning the proper way to 
make a U-turn, that a vehicle attempting to make a U-turn should 
steer to the far left-hand-side of the lane, should signal well in 
advance, should turn left onto the opposite shoulder of the roadway 
(the shoulder to the left of the driver), should stop, and then 
should complete the U-turn on such shoulder of the roadway before 
pulling back into traffic traveling in the opposite direction (T. 
44, line 25; T. 45, lines 1-2; T. 47, lines 10-16, 22-25; T. 48, 
3 
line 1; T. 59, lines 1-9; T. 60, lines 4-10; T. 65, lines 12-15; T. 
66, lines 20-25; T. 67, line 1). 
10. It was Defendant Warren Yarnell's belief that the proper 
way for a car to make a U-turn was to first pull completely off 
onto the right hand shoulder of the roadway, to stop, to allow all 
traffic to pass, and then to complete the U-turn in the middle of 
the roadway, by turning sharply to the left across both lanes of 
traffic, until the U-turn was completed and the car was traveling 
in the opposite direction (T. 117, lines 16-25; T. 118, lines 1-5; 
T. 120, lines 7-21; T. 135, lines 16-19). 
11. Tina Noonan testified that she believed she saw the 
driver and passenger of the Yarnell vehicle engaged in 
conversation, as she g ..impsed into her rearview mirror just prior 
to the accident (T. 45, lines 22-24; T. 66, lines 4-8; T. 67, lines 
2-4). Mr. and Mrs. Yarnell testified that they were not engaged 
in conversation just prior to the accident (T. 132, lines 20-25; T. 
133, lines 1-2; T. 365, lines 21-22). 
12. Just prior to the accident, Plaintiff Tina Noonan was 
focusing her full attention on her driving, and was concerned about 
giving a clear indication to the Yarnell vehicle that she was going 
to make a left hand or U-turn onto the lefthand shoulder of the 
roadway, because she believed the driver of the Yarnell vehicle was 
not paying close attention to his driving (T. 43, lines 5-11; T. 
44, lines 8-12, 24-25; T. 45, lines 1-11, 16-20, 22-24; T. 46, 
lines 19-25; T. 47, lines 1, 10-16; T. 48, lines 13-20; T. 50, 
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lines 1-13; T. 60, lines 4-10; T. 66, lines 4-8, 20-25; T. 67, 
lines 1-4; T. 145, lines 12-21). 
13. It was the testimony of both Tina Noonan and Donald 
Kennedy that Ms. Noonan began signaling for a lefthand turn quite 
some distance (perhaps as much as 1,000 feet) prior to beginning 
her left hand/U-turn (T. 44, lines 22-25; T. 45, lines 1-9, 16-18; 
T. 46, lines 19-22; T. 65, lines 20-24; T. 73, lines 3-11, 23-25; 
T. 74, lines 1, 21-25; T. 79, lines 18-21; T. 97, lines 14-23; T. 
98, lines 1-20; T. 145, lines 12-25; T. 146, lines 1-10; T. 163, 
lines 17-21; Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2). 
14. Warren Yarnell testified that he first noticed the Noonan 
vehicle when he was at the top of the hill and when the Noonan 
vehicle was at the bottom of the hill beginning to slow down (T. 
49, lines 7-13; T. 120, lines 1-6; T. 124, lines 16-25; T. 125, 
lines 1-4; T. 129, lines 12-13; T. 130, lines 20-25). He 
testified that he did not notice the actions of the Noonan vehicle 
again until just prior to the crash, and that he did not notice 
that the Noonan vehicle was signaling for a left hand turn, but 
only noticed the brake lights of the Noonan vehicle (T. 114, lines 
13-15; T. 115, lines 14-22; T. 116, lines 4-5, 17; T. 118, lines 
24-25; T. 119, lines 1-5; T. 131, lines 1-21; T. 136, lines 21-25; 
T. 137, lines 1-5). Mrs. Yarnell, who was a passenger in the 
Yarnell vehicle, testified that she initially noticed the Noonan 
vehicle while the Yarnell vehicle was near the top of the hill and 
the Noonan vehicle was near the bottom of the hill (T. 373, lines 
21-23; T. 375, lines 2-5). She testified that she did not notice 
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the actions of the Noonan vehicle again until just prior to the 
accident, and that she noticed one blink of the left hand turn 
signal, and the brake lights, of the Noonan vehicle (T. 367, lines 
4-8; T. 373, lines 21-23; T. 374, lines 4-5; 375, lines 14-15). 
15. When Mr. Yarnell noticed Tina Noonan's actions just prior 
to the accident, he believed that she was in the process of making 
a U-turn, and he anticipated that she would do this by first 
pulling off to the right hand shoulder of the road and stopping to 
let all traffic pass, before completing her U-turn (T. 118, lines 
6-12, 24-25; T. 120, lines 7-21; T. 123, lines 14-25; T. 124. lines 
1-2; T. 129, lines 12-14, 19-24; T. 137, lines 3-14). Based on 
this anticipation, he began to pass the Noonan vehicle on the left 
hand side of the Noonan vehicle (T. 118, lines 13-15, 21-25; T. 
123, lines 14-25; T. 124, lines 1-15; T. 125, lines 14-24; T. 129, 
lines 12-15; T. 130, lines 7-19; T. 134, lines 13-24; T. 137, lines 
3-14). Mr. Yarnell testified that even if he had seen the Noonan 
vehicle signaling for a left hand turn while he was a great 
distance from the Noonan vehicle, he would not have taken any 
different action, because he still would have believed that Tina 
Noonan would first pull off to the right hand shoulder of the road 
and stop, before completing her U-turn (T. 123, lines 14-25; T. 
124, lines 1-2) . 
16. Mr. and Mrs. Yarnell testified that after Mr. Yarnell 
began to pass the Noonan vehicle on the left hand side of the 
Noonan vehicle, the Noonan vehicle suddenly turned left directly in 
front of the Yarnell vehicle, and Mr. Yarnell attempted to steer 
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even farther to the left to avoid a collision, but was unsuccessful 
in avoiding a collision (T. 114, lines 10-12; T. 115, lines 10-13; 
T. 118, lines 13-20; T. 123, lines 11-13; T. 133, lines 8-10; T. 
146, lines 16-25; T. 147, line 1; T. 365, lines 1-20; T. 374, lines 
20-25; T. 375, lines 1-23; Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). They further 
testified that Mr. Yarnell did not attempt to slow the speed of his 
vehicle after first seeing Mrs. Noonan's car, until he slammed on 
his brakes when the collision appeared to be imminent (T. 120, 
lines 22-25; T. 121, lines 1-18; T. 127, lines 5-7; T. 147, lines 
20-25; T. 148, lines 1-2; T. 374, lines 20-25; T. 375, lines 1-23). 
17. The point of impact of the collision was approximately 
three feet eight inches to the left/west of the center line of the 
roadway (T. 411, lines 12-25; T. 412, lines 1-8). 
18. It was the testimony of Mr. Yarnell's expert witness 
that the physical evidence of the accident, the point of impact, 
the angle of collision of the vehicles, and the final resting place 
of the vehicles was consistent with the Yarnells' version of how 
the accident occurred—namely, that the Noonan vehicle first pulled 
off onto the right hand shoulder of the roadway, and then turned 
sharply to the left directly in front of the Yarnell vehicle (T. 
119, lines 6-25; T. 120, line 1; T. 122, lines 12-23; T. 126, lines 
24-25; T. 127, lines 1-4, 20-25; T. 128, lines 11-19; T. 129, lines 
16-18; T. 130, lines 6-19; T. 131, lines 1-25; T. 132, lines 1-9; 
T. 140, lines 24-25; T. 141, lines 1-10; T. 144, lines 11-24; T. 
146, lines 16-25; T. 147, lines 1-25; T. 148, lines 1-2; T. 151, 
lines 2-25; T. 152, lines 1-4, 23-25; T. 153, lines 1-25; T. 154, 
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lines 1-7, 15; T. 156, lines 6-25; T. 163, lines 17-25; T. 164, 
lines 1-7; T. 165, lines 4-21; T. 365, lines 1-25; T. 374, lines 
20-25; T. 375, lines 1-23; T. 388, line 1 through T. 396, line 21; 
T. 411, lines 18-25; T. 412, lines 1-8; T. 441, lines 1-25; T. 442, 
lines 1-11; Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). It was the testimony of the 
investigating officer, Sergeant Hartman, and the Plaintiff's expert 
witness that the point of impact, the angle of collision, and the 
final resting place of the vehicles was inconsistent with the 
Yarnell's version of the how the accident occurred, but rather was 
consistent with Tina Noonan's version of how the accident occurred 
—namely, that she did not pull off onto the right shoulder of the 
road, but rather began her left hand turn while she was within the 
paved portion of the north bound lane of traffic (T. 47, lines 4-6; 
T 48, lines 21-25; T. 49, lines 1-2; T. 65, lines 16-19; T. 122, 
lines 12-23; T. 126, lines 24-25; T. 127, lines 1-4, 20-25; T. 128, 
lines 11-19; T. 140, lines 24-25; T. 141, lines 1-10; T. 144, lines 
11-24; T. 145, lines 4-23; T. 147, lines 1-25; T. 148, lines 1-2; 
T. 151, lines 2-25; T. 152, lines 1-4, 23-25; T. 153, lines 1-25; 
T. 154, lines 1-7, 15; T. 156, lines 6-25; T. 163, lines 17-25; T. 
164, lines 1-7; T. 165, lines 4-21; T. 183, line 5 through T. 200, 
line 11; T. 213, lines 24-25; T. 214, lines 1-23; T. 219 through T. 
228; T. 229, line 1; T. 411, lines 12-25; T. 412, lines 1-8; 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2). 
19. The "sworn statement" or "deposition" of Mr. Kennedy was 
scheduled by Defendant's attorney at Mr. Kennedy's residence, with 
a court reporter present (T. 76, lines 8-16; T. 77, lines 5-7, 12-
8 
15). The court reporter and a representative from Defendant's 
insurance company arrived a little bit early, and visited with Mr. 
Kennedy prior to the taking of the sworn statement/deposition (T. 
8, lines 4-7; T. 10, lines 16-25; T. 11, lines 1-9, 24-25; T. 12, 
lines 4-7; T. 77, lines 12-19). 
20. Prior to the taking of Mr. Kennedy's sworn 
statement/deposition, Mr. Kennedy asked Defendant's attorney if he 
could review the accident report and his written statement made at 
the time of the accident to refresh his memory, prior to testifying 
(T. 76, lines 21-23; T. 80, lines 15-22; T. 101, lines 14-21). 
Defendant's attorney agreed to allow Mr. Kennedy to review such 
accident report and written statement, but failed to do so until 
the sworn statement/deposition was approximately three-fourths 
completed, and even then, he was allowed to review this information 
only for a short time before further questioning (T. 76, lines 21-
25; T. 78, lines 3-6; T. 79, line 25; T. 80, lines 1-8, 15-22; T. 
81, lines 6-13, 18-24; T. 82, lines 17-23; T. 83, lines 2-25; T. 
84, lines 1-8; T. 86, lines 10-23; T. 87, lines 22-25; T. 90, lines 
14-16; T. 95, lines 9-10; T. 101, lines 14-21, 25; T. 102, lines 1-
2; T. 104, lines 14-17, 25; T. 105, lines 1-24). By the time Mr. 
Kennedy was allowed to review the police report and his prior 
written statement, he had already testified contrary to his prior 
written statement, based on his unrefreshed memory of the accident 
(T. 78, lines 7-23; T. 82, lines 17-25; T. 83, lines 1-12, 19-25; 
T.84, lines 1-23; T. 94, lines 8-15; T. 95, lines 20-25; T. 96, 
lines 1-13; T. 103, lines 12-21; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). After 
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having a chance to review the police report and his written 
statement and to think about such information, his refreshed memory 
was consistent with his statement made at the time of the accident 
(T. 73, lines 9-25; T. 74, lines 1-25; T. 78, lines 24-25; T. 79, 
line 1, 4-25; T. 80, lines 1-8; T. 98, lines 23-25; T. 99, lines 1-
10; T. 102, lines 3-24; T. 104, lines 4-21; T. 108, lines 4-25; T. 
109, lines 1-9; T. 144, lines 1-10; T. 148, lines 12-24; T. 163, 
lines 17-25; T. 164, lines 1-7; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). 
21. Although the taking of Mr. Kennedy's sworn 
statement/deposition lasted more than two hours, the sworn 
statement/deposition transcript contains only twenty-five pages of 
script (T. 86, lines 10-18; R. 520, 538-540 and "Deposition of 
Donald J. Kennedy"). Mr. Kennedy testified at trial that during 
the taking of such sworn statement/deposition Defendant's attorney 
went on and off the record so many times that he did not know when 
they were off the record and when they were on the record (T. 87, 
lines 18-21). 
22. At the time of taking Mr. Kennedy's sworn 
statement/deposition, Defendant's attorney told Mr. Kennedy that he 
could make corrections to the transcript when he received it for 
review (T. 76, lines 19-20; T. 88, lines 2-12, 15-23). Upon 
receiving the transcript for review, and after having a chance to 
review the police report and his written statement, Mr. Kennedy was 
distressed, because he felt that the testimony he had given at the 
sworn statement/deposition, prior to the time when he was allowed 
to refresh his memory by reading the police report and his written 
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statement, was almost completely contrary to what had actually 
occurred at the time of the accident (T. 82, lines 17-25; T. 83, 
lines 1-12, 19-25; T. 84, lines 4-23; T. 87, lines 14-17; T. 88, 
lines 2-12; T. 103, lines 12-21; T. 107, lines 23-25; T. 108, lines 
1-3; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). He was informed by Tina Noonan's 
attorneys that he had the right to make corrections to the 
transcript, and he did so (T. 88, lines 2-12, 15-23). 
23. Because Mr. Kennedy is a professional driver, and 
because the subject accident occurred approximately four-and-one-
half years before the taking of Mr. Kennedy's sworn 
statement/deposition by Defendant's attorney, Mr. Kennedy had 
witnessed several other accidents following the subject accident 
(T. 69, lines 10-16; T. 80, lines 9-12; T. 101, lines 22-24; T. 
104, lines 22-24). Without first being able to refresh his memory 
concerning the subject accident, in retrospect, Donald Kennedy 
believed that he may have confused the subject accident with other 
accidents, and therefore, testified inaccurately at the taking of 
his sworn statement/deposition (T. 80, lines 9-12; T. 81, lines 6-
13, 18-25; T. 82, lines 1-4, 15-25; T. 83, lines 1-12, 19-25; T. 
84, lines 1-23; T. 91, lines 13-15; T. 94, lines 8-15; T. 104, 
lines 22-24). Mr. Kennedy made the changes to the transcript of 
his sworn statement/deposition on his own, without any kind of 
inappropriate coercion or persuasion from Plaintiff's attorneys (T. 
85, lines 12-15; T. 86, lines 2-4; T. 87, lines 14-17; T. 88, lines 
3-12; T. 91, lines 9-23; T. 95, lines 6-8; T. 104, lines 13-21; T. 
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106, lines 1-25; T. 107, lines 1-22; T. 109, lines 24-25; T. 110, 
lines 1-7). 
24. In its special verdict, the jury found that although Mr. 
Yarnell was negligent, his negligence was not a proximate cause of 
the subject accident (R.235, 346-347). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A marshalling of the evidence demonstrates that although the 
jury could have concluded that Tina Noonan was contributorily 
negligent and that her negligence was a concurrent proximate cause 
of the accident, they could not have reasonably concluded that 
Warren Yarnell's negligence was not at least a concurrent proximate 
cause of the accident. 
The court committed reversible error by submitting Jury 
Instruction No. 10 to the jury. Such jury instruction clearly 
misstated the applicable law and misled the jury, which prejudiced 
Appellant's case. 
It was error for the court to refuse to allow Sergeant Hartman 
to testify as an expert witness, whereas such testimony was clearly 
admissible. 
The trial court erred in allowing admission of portions of the 
sworn statement/deposition testimony of Donald Kennedy because: (1) 
Defendant did not comply with U.R.C.P. Rule 30 in obtaining such 
testimony, and (2) the probative value of such testimony was 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
Appellant has a good faith, extremely meritorious basis for 
appealing the trial court judgment. Accordingly, this appeal is 
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not frivolous. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A MORE THOROUGH MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE STILL 
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
In marshalling the evidence more thoroughly in Appellant's 
Reply Brief, Appellant has attempted to address all evidence 
concerning any possible cause that could have proximately resulted 
in the subject accident. Plaintiff has categorized the possible 
causes of the accident into five separate categories: 
1. Physical conditions present at the accident site at 
the time of the accident; 
2. Physical conditions of the vehicles at the time of the 
accident; 
3. Physical/mental condition of the drivers at the time of 
the accident; 
4. Actions of the drivers at the time of the accident; 
5. Physical evidence found at the accident site following 
the accident. 
After analyzing the evidence relating to these factors, it is 
apparent that the jury's verdict, namely, that although Defendant 
was negligent, his negligence did not proximately cause the subject 
automobile accident, was manifestly against the weight of the 
evidence. 
A, Physical conditions of accident site. 
The evidence presented at trial concerning the physical 
conditions present at the accident site at the time of the accident 
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was that the weather was sunny and clear, with good lighting, and 
no glare from the sun. 
The road conditions were dry and clear. The road design was 
such as to give Mr. Yarnell a clear, unobstructed view of the 
accident site. The intersection of 1900 West and 1200 North sits 
on top of a hill, which then inclines downward to the north. This 
should have given Mr. Yarnell a better view of northbound traffic 
than he would have had on level ground. Mr. Yarnell testified that 
he had an unobstructed view of traffic to the north prior to the 
accident. 
There was no evidence admitted at trial to prove that there 
were any intervening forces, such as weather or road conditions, 
other traffic, a pedestrian, an animal, or an act of God, that 
contributed to the cause of the accident. All witnesses testified 
that there was no southbound traffic prior to or at the time of the 
subject accident. Accordingly, the jury had no evidence on which 
to base a conclusion that the accident was proximately caused by 
any of the physical conditions present at the accident site at the 
time of the accident. 
B. Physical condition of vehicles. 
There was no evidence admitted at trial to prove that there 
were any manufacturing or design defects in either of the two 
vehicles involved in the accident. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence admitted at trial to prove that there were any 
malfunctions of the vehicles, which contributed to the causation of 
the accident. Moreover, the only testimony at trial concerning 
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the condition of the vehicles was that both vehicles were rather 
new vehicles, and that both vehicles were functioning properly at 
the time of the accident. Accordingly, this evidence fails to 
support the jury's verdict. 
C. Physical/mental condition of the drivers. 
The evidence showed that both drivers had valid drivers 
licenses, and were wearing their eyeglasses at the time of the 
accident. The evidence showed that Mr. Yarnell may have been 
taking medication at the time of the accident. The evidence 
further showed that Mr. Yarnell was 70 years old, creating the 
inference that Mr. Yarnell's physical reactions were slowed to some 
extent, because of the natural aging process. 
The evidence showed that Mrs. Noonan was unfamiliar with the 
area, and had missed her planned turn-off. However, the evidence 
also showed that Mrs. Noonan was paying careful attention to her 
driving, because she was looking for a place to safely complete a 
U-turn. On the other hand, the evidence showed that Mr. Yarnell 
was not paying close attention to his driving, whereas he first 
noticed Mrs. Noonan's vehicle when she was slowing down at the 
bottom of the hill, and did not notice the actions of Mrs. Noonan's 
vehicle again, until he was only a few car lengths away from Mrs. 
Noonan's vehicle as it began to make a left hand turn. Mr. Yarnell 
did not see the blinking left turn signal of Tina Noonan's car. 
Mrs. Noonan had an accurate understanding about the legally 
correct way in which to make a U-turn. Mr. Yarnell had an 
inaccurate understanding about how a U-turn should be made. 
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Moreover, Mr. Yarnell testified that just prior to the accident he 
anticipated that Mrs. Noonan was about to execute a U-turn in the 
manner in which Mr. Yarnell thought a U-turn should be executed 
(namely, by pulling off onto the right hand shoulder of the road 
and stopping to let traffic pass, before completing such U-turn in 
the middle of the roadway). This anticipation on the part of Mr. 
Yarnell was what initially prompted Mr. Yarnell to begin to pass 
the Noonan vehicle to the left of the Noonan vehicle. Mr. Yarnell 
also testified that he would not have changed his course of action 
even if he had observed Mrs. Noonan's left turn signal for a 
significant distance. 
Although the above described evidence supports to some extent 
a conclusion on the part of a reasonable jury that Mrs. Noonan may 
also have been negligent, and that her negligence may also have 
been a proximate cause of the subject accident, it does not support 
the jury's conclusion that Mr. Yarnell's negligence was not a 
concurrent, additional proximate cause of the subject accident. 
D. Actions taken by drivers. 
Based on the evidence stated above in the statement of 
additional facts, one of the conclusions a reasonable jury 
unavoidably would have made was that Mr. Yarnell was not paying 
close attention to his driving (T. 74, lines 8-11), and that he did 
not react appropriately to the obvious hazard created by Tina 
Noonan in signaling and slowing down for a lefthand turn. He did 
not notice that Mrs. Noonan was signaling to make a lefthand turn. 
Instead, he erroneously anticipated that Mrs. Noonan's vehicle was 
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going to pull off onto the righthand shoulder of the road and stop. 
Therefore, he began to pass Mrs. Noonan's vehicle on the lefthand 
side of Mrs. Noonan's vehicle, directly into the course of Mrs. 
Noonan's apparent lefthand turn, without even slowing down his 
vehicle as a precautionary measure. 
Thus, even though a reasonable jury could have determined that 
Tina Noonan may have been negligent in addition to Mr. Yarnell's 
negligence, a reasonable jury could not have determined that Mr. 
Yarnell's negligence did not constitute a concurrent, proximate 
cause of the subject accident. 
E. Physical evidence following accident. 
Following the subject accident, Officer Hartman's investiga-
tion showed that the point of impact occurred three feet eight 
inches to the left of the center line of the roadway. The 
investigation also showed that there were no tire marks in the 
gravel on the righthand side of the roadway. Finally, his 
investigation showed that there was damage to the right front 
fender of the Yarnell vehicle, and to the left front fender of the 
Noonan vehicle. His investigation showed that the vehicles came 
to rest in a field northwest of the point of impact, with both 
vehicles facing in a northwesterly direction. 
For purposes of this appeal, it must be concluded that the 
jury believed the Defendant's expert witness in interpreting the 
physical evidence. However, the physical evidence and expert 
witness testimony does nothing more than corroborate the Yarnells' 
version of the accident, as has been explained above. This 
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evidence does absolutely nothing to prove that Mr. Yarnell's 
negligence, in failing to slow down his vehicle when he observed a 
potential hazard ahead of him, in failing to observe the blinking 
lefthand turn signal of the Noonan vehicle, and in passing the 
Noonan vehicle on the lefthand side even though the Noonan vehicle 
was signaling to make a left hand turn, was not a proximate cause 
of the subject accident. Rather, this evidence merely supports 
the conclusion that Tina Noonan may have also been negligent, and 
that her negligence may have also been a concurrent proximate cause 
of the subject accident. 
POINT II. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10 CLEARLY MISLED THE JURY IN THIS CASE, 
BY INCORRECTLY STATING THE LAW RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES OF 
NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
Jury instruction No. 10 stated in relevant part: 
"A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a speed so 
slow as to impede or block the normal and reasonable 
movement of traffic except when: (a) Reduced speed is 
necessary for safe operation; (b) Upon a grade; or (c) In 
compliance with official traffic control devises." 
(R. 278.) As was explained in Appellant's Original Brief on pages 
16 and 17, this jury instruction clearly and incorrectly implies 
that even if a vehicle is in the process of making a proper left-
hand turn, it cannot impede the flow of traffic traveling in the 
same direction. However, common sense as well as statutory law 
recognizes that to execute a proper lefthand turn a car may be 
required to slow down and perhaps even stop, impeding the traffic 
behind it. Accordingly, the law allows a vehicle making a proper 
lefthand turn to impede traffic traveling in the same direction. 
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See, U.C.A. §41-6-73 and U.C.A. §41-6-55(3). 
Utah case law does not support Defendant's arguments that Jury 
Instruction No. 10 was properly submitted to the jury; rather, it 
supports the opposite proposition. In the case of Nielsen v. 
Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 1992), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
"[J]urors are sworn to follow the instructions as given 
by the court and they are not bound by explanations from 
counsel for the parties as to their meaning. More basic, 
however, is the principle that parties are entitled to 
clear instructions setting out their theories of the 
case, and argument by counsel is not an adequate 
substitute for that entitlement." 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that while lawyers and judges may 
be able to interpret jury instructions that are not perfectly 
clear, lay juries cannot be guaranteed to do so. Ld. at 274. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that parties are entitled to 
"a presentation of the case to the jury under instructions that 
clearly, concisely and accurately state the issues in the laws 
applicable thereto so that the jury will understand its duties." 
Id. at 275. 
Based upon this standard, it is clear that the court erred in 
submitting Jury Instruction No. 10 to the jury. Not only did the 
plain language of the jury instruction misstate the applicable law, 
but also, it would have been difficult for even a trained legal 
mind to have guessed the court's intended interpretation of such 
jury instruction. 
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The submission of an improper jury instruction is reversible 
error if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the 
complaining party. Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah 
App. 1991); See also, Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
It was an undisputed fact in this case that Tina Noonan slowed 
her vehicle to the point that it impeded the progress of Mr. 
Yarnell's vehicle, in order to make her lefthand turn. If the jury 
was under the false impression that to do so was negligence on the 
part of Mrs. Noonan, it is probable that this incorrect 
interpretation of the law resulted in the jury's erroneous verdict. 
Based on this jury instruction, it is foreseeable that a reasonable 
jury could have concluded that Mrs. Noonan should bear absolute 
responsibility for the accident, despite any apparent negligence on 
the part of Mr. Yarnell. Therefore, it is clear that the court's 
action in submitting Jury Instruction No. 10 was prejudicial to 
Plaintiff's case, and constituted reversible error. 
POINT III, 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER TO GIVE EXPERT OPINION 
TESTIMONY. 
During trial, the court would not allow Sergeant Hartman to 
give his expert opinion concerning (a) the cause of the subject 
accident, (b) the manner in which it occurred, (c) whether 
Yarnell's actions in passing Noonan were improper, or (d) whether 
Yarnell could have done anything to avoid the accident (T. 149-150, 
154-157) . 
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It was clearly improper for the court to refuse to allow 
Sergeant Hartman to give his expert opinion concerning why he 
believed Mr. Yarnell's actions in passing Tina Noonan's vehicle 
were improper and concerning whether Mr. Yarnell could have taken 
any actions to avoid the collision (T. 155, lines 2-25; T. 156, 
lines 1-2; T. 157. lines 1-5). Because of his experience and 
training (T. 138-139), it was clear that Sergeant Hartman was 
qualified to testify concerning these issues. Neither of these 
opinions would have constituted a legal conclusion, but instead, 
would have constituted allowable expert opinion testimony on which 
the jury could have based their own legal conclusions related to 
the issues of negligence and proximate cause. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING ADMISSION OF PORTIONS 
OF THE SWORN STATEMENT/DEPOSITION OF DONALD J. KENNEDY AT 
TRIAL. 
Defendant argues that the testimony he obtained from Donald 
Kennedy was a "sworn statement," and not a "deposition," and 
therefore, U.R.C.P. Rule 30 did not apply. However, the process in 
which Donald Kennedy's testimony was obtained resembles a 
deposition in every aspect, except that Defendant purposely 
neglected to give Plaintiff notice of such proceeding (R. 496-497). 
Donald Kennedy was placed under oath, and was told that such 
testimony could be used against him at trial. Defendant's attorney 
interrogated Mr. Kennedy in an aggressive manner in an attempt to 
get Mr. Kennedy to testify favorably to her client's position in 
the case (T. 98, lines 23-25; T. 99, lines 1-25; T. 100, lines 1-
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10). Defendant's counsel went on and off the record many times 
during the questioning session. Defendant's attorney told Mr. 
Kennedy that he would have a chance to review and correct the 
transcript of his testimony. Such testimony was thereafter 
transcribed, and was entitled "Deposition of Donald J. Kennedy." 
Regardless of whether Defendant's attorney wishes to refer to 
such proceeding as the taking of a "sworn statement," rather than 
as a "deposition," the end product is identical. Furthermore, if 
the court allows Defendant in this case to ignore the notice 
requirement of U.R.C.P. Rule 30 simply by referring to a deposition 
as a "sworn statement," the court will have created a precedent 
that allows a party to gain an unfair advantage in any case, with-
out any recourse to the other parties, simply by being the first 
one to contact potential, non-party, fact witnesses. Such a ruling 
would have a drastic, harmful impact on the fairness and equity of 
all civil litigation in Utah. On the other hand, because of 
Defendant's failure to comply with the notice requirements of 
U.R.C.P. Rule 30, it would not be harsh, inequitable or 
unreasonable to "penalize" the Defendant in this case by refusing 
to allow Defendant to use his ill-gotten "sworn 
statement"/"deposition" testimony at trial, to gain an unfair 
advantage over the Plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the trial court's admission of the sworn 
statement/deposition testimony of Donald Kennedy, even for a 
limited purpose, was reversible error, because of the obvious lack 
of reliability of such testimony. Mr. Kennedy asked for an 
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opportunity to review the accident report and his written statement 
given at the accident scene, prior to being questioned. However, 
Defendant's attorney allowed him to review such accident report and 
written statement only after most of his testimony had already been 
taken. Then, he was given only a short time to read and review 
such statement, before being asked further questions. 
In addition, although the taking of Mr. Kennedy's sworn 
statement/deposition required more than two hours, the written 
transcript constitutes only 25 pages. Mr. Kennedy testified at 
trial that Defendant's attorney went on and off the record so many 
times that he was not sure of when he was on the record and when he 
was off the record. These two facts indicate that Defendant's 
attorney may have recorded, out-of-context, only those responses of 
Mr. Kennedy that were favorable to her client's case. Finally, 
Defendant's counsel was aggressive in attempting to persuade Mr. 
Kennedy to testify favorably to her client's case, and Plaintiff's 
counsel had no opportunity to make objections or to cross-examine 
Mr. Kennedy to remedy any irregularities or errors in procedure 
that occurred during such oral examination. 
Even though the court determined that such "sworn 
statement"/"deposition" was admissible under U.R.E. Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) (despite Defendant's failure to comply with U.R.C.P. 
Rule 30), such evidence should still have been excluded under 
U.R.E. Rule 403, because the danger of unfair prejudice created by 
such evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has held that even when a trial court has 
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concluded that evidence is admissible under another rule, the 
court's inquiry is not complete, until the court concludes that the 
evidence meets the requirements of U.R.E. Rule 403. See, State v. 
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 571 (Utah App. 1991). Evidence is unfairly 
prejudicial if it has a tendency to influence the trial by improper 
means. Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 69 
(Utah App. 1992) . 
In this case, because such "sworn statement"/"deposition" was 
taken under oath, it was especially prejudicial. Defendant's 
attorney implied to the jury that such prior inconsistent state-
ments were actually more credible than Mr. Kennedy's written state-
ment given at the accident site and his trial testimony (T.84, 
lines 24-25; T. 85, lines 1-11; T. 87, lines 12-17; T. 90, lines 
12-25; T. 91, lines 16-18; T. 100, lines 15-17). Because of the 
jury's lack of sophistication, they were unable to recognize that 
Mr. Kennedy's sworn statement/deposition testimony was totally 
unreliable. 
On the other hand, the overwhelming weight of the credible 
evidence showed that the statement made by Mr. Kennedy at the time 
of the accident and his trial testimony constituted the most 
accurate, credible account of the events leading up to the accident 
(T. 151, lines 11-25; T. 152, line 1). 
As has been explained above, by allowing Defendant's use of 
the "sworn statement"/"deposition" testimony of Mr. Kennedy, the 
trial court clearly allowed Defendant to influence the trial by 
improper means. This is the very type of unfair prejudice that is 
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sought to be prevented by proper application of U.R.E. Rule 403. 
Accordingly, it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to 
conduct a weighing test pursuant to U.R.E. Rule 403, and to prevent 
admission of the "sworn statement"/"deposition" testimony of Donald 
Kennedy for even a limited purpose, because its prejudicial effect 
substantially outweighed its probative value. 
POINT V, 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS. 
Plaintiff has made a several extremely meritorious, good faith 
arguments for reversal of the trial court's judgment in this case. 
Because of the merit of Plaintiff's arguments, Plaintiff fully 
expects that the Court of Appeals will agree with the Plaintiff, 
and will remand this case for a new trial. Accordingly, 
Defendant's claim that Plaintiff's appeal is frivolous is totally 
unsubstantiated, and is barely worthy of a response. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests the 
court to reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. 
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